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Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Constitutional Change in Scotland 
Introduction  
A referendum on Scottish independence from the United Kingdom takes place on 18 
September 2014. A vote in favour of independence will lead to the break-up of a 
union which has existed since 1707, with a planned independence date, following 
negotiations, set for 24 March 2016. Between the referendum and the planned 
independence date, a UK General Election will be held, in which the issue of UK 
membership of the European Union will loom large (Appendix 1).  
 Independence will have far-reaching and irreversible implications for the 
economies of both Scotland and the rest of the UK (rUK) and their businesses and 
stakeholders. The original and ultimate “single market”, in which economies north 
and south of the border are totally integrated, will be dissolved. Businesses which 
operated freely across borders will overnight become exporters, importers and 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (and movement of people becomes international 
migration). This paper focuses more narrowly on the implications of constitutional 
change for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and overseas -owned MNEs in 
Scotland, although some observations are also made on the wider international 
business scene in Scotland and rUK because of the integrated nature of much business 
activity. 
 In the period after 1945, the attraction of inward FDI was a key policy instrument 
of the UK government to deal with deindustrialization and regional disparities in 
income, and Scotland was very successful in attracting overseas-owned enterprises 
(Dimitratos et al., 2009). Inward FDI attraction, especially from the USA, has 
continued to be as an important policy instrument to the present day and makes a 
crucial contribution to the economy. Sustaining and enhancing the contribution of 
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inward investment will be essential in any independent Scotland. The key issue and 
focus of this paper is thus the potential implications of independence for inward FDI 
in Scotland.  
 MNEs operate within a variety of political regimes in their regional and global 
operations and hence are not unaccustomed to political and economic risks. Political 
risk is associated with host (usually) government interference with business 
operations (Kobrin, 1979) and may take many forms. But secessions present 
challenges and opportunities which are ubiquitous; and being relatively uncommon, 
MNEs and their subsidiaries are hence less experienced in their management. 
 Following this introduction, the paper provides a brief overview of the 
institutional environment for international business in Scotland and the Scottish 
Government’s economic strategy. The next section reviews the background of inward 
foreign investment in Scotland, followed by an assessment of the current landscape 
and performance of inward FDI and the implications for the foreign-owned sector in 
an independent Scotland. The final sections consider the opportunities and challenges 
for the future of an independent Scotland; and the influences of political risks and 
uncertainties on investor strategies.  
 
The Country and Institutional Background 
For several decades after 1945, Scotland continued to suffer  from industrial decline, a 
legacy of its heavy engineering past, with per capita GDP growth and other measures 
of economic well-being remaining lower than the rest of the UK. It was this which led 
in 1979 to the so-called Barnett formula which (still today) provides a block grant to 
partially offset income differentials in the poorer regions of the UK (McCrone, 2013). 
This has meant that public expenditure in Scotland is around 10 percent higher than 
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the UK average. However Scotland’s economic circumstances have changed 
substantially, due in significant part to the success of inward FDI. The performance of 
the Scottish economy has been similar to the UK average for more than a decade and 
on various measures of economic performance is nearer to the UK average than 
regions outside London and the South East of England, although this is in part due 
out-migration (McGregor and Swales, 2013). By the measure of labour productivity, 
both Scotland and the UK are close to the OECD average. (For an overview of recent 
developments in the Scottish economy, see Liddell et al., 2014). 
 Constitutionally the Scottish Parliament was established in 1999, bringing with it a 
series of devolved decision-making powers (Appendix 1). However, Scotland has had 
a high level of independence for many years in areas of economic and industrial 
development. Since 2001 international business policy has been implemented through 
Scottish Development International (SDI): its formation was associated with a radical 
rethink in approach following the virtual demise of electronics, focusing upon “global 
connections” and designed to build a globally integrated economy (Scottish 
Executive, 2001a, b).  This has led to stronger emphasis in favour of exporting, but 
also to a wider perspective on target sectors and countries for investment (Table 1) 
(Scottish Government, 2007; SDI, 2011).  
 
Insert Table 1 near here 
 
Inward Foreign Direct Investment into Scotland 
For four decades following 1945, Scotland was both a welcoming and attractive 
location for greenfield, market-seeking FDI in manufacturing industry, largely from 
the USA. The principal determinants were regional financial assistance, the 
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availability of low cost labour and the English language. Competition in this period 
was mainly from Ireland and to some extent Spain. Within a largely healthy scene, 
there was also significant volatility. In the late 1970s this was associated with 
technological restructuring as electronics replaced mechanical engineering, and pan-
European strategies were evolving with integrated supply chains. More significant 
was the next stage of multinational integration from regional to global strategies 
which in the 1990s was associated with plant closures and relocations to Eastern 
Europe and East Asia and a devastating collapse in the electronics industry in “Silicon 
Glen” (Dimitratos et al., 2009). Fundamentally Scotland was a “branch plant 
economy” where footloose foreign-owned firms were weakly embedded  in the local 
milieu, representing “competence-exploiting” as opposed to “competence-creating” 
FDI (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). Still, the foreign-owned sector remained through 
this period as the most productive, best-paying, innovative and export-oriented group 
of manufacturing firms in Scotland (Dimitratos et al., 2009).  
 
The inward FDI landscape today  
The estimates of overall trends of FDI into Scotland over the period 2003-2012 are 
shown in Appendix 2. In total 745 projects were attracted over the period, generating 
76,000 new jobs and £24.6bn. in capital expenditure. While no direct comparisons are 
possible with earlier years, the data show a continuance of the long-term trend to 
smaller projects, especially in terms of employment creation: during this period, the 
average project generated 102 jobs with capital investment of $33mn. The US was the 
main source country accounting for 40 percent of projects. There was also significant 
concentration by sector: for example, coal, oil & gas plus renewable energy 
represented over 50 percent of all capital investment (but only 13% of jobs); whereas 
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food, drink & tobacco was the top job creator (11,658 jobs, 15.2% of the total). 
Despite this concentration, outside the top ten the category of “Other sectors” 
represented 38 percent of projects and 40 percent of jobs. 
 Using a different data source (Ernst & Young, 2012, 2013[1]), within a UK 
context Scottish performance regarding inward FDI attraction has been striking in the 
recent past. In 2012, the country was ranked 2nd among the twelve UK regions in 
terms of both number of projects (11% of total, with London #1) and job creation 
(16%, with the North West of England #1). In 2011, Scotland’s share of projects was 
a much smaller 7.5 percent (ranked #3), but it was leading location for job creation as 
it had been in 2010. Ernst & Young (2012: 17) suggest “this strong performance may 
reflect the committed approach of Scottish Development International over many 
years”. 
 It is significant that pre-referendum Scotland is already heading in a different 
sectoral direction to that of the UK as a whole, where business services and software 
were the most important sectors in 2012; machinery & equipment, electronics and 
automotive components were also represented in the UK top 10 by share of projects 
(Ernst & Young, 2013). While strong in FDI R&D projects, still the UK as a whole 
struggles in manufacturing (and Scotland may be facing a particularly acute 
challenge). Bell (2011) argues that Scottish manufacturing is retrenching to industries 
like food and drink where it had a comparative advantage but where innovation is 
weak.  
 Overall, the Scottish economy is highly dependent upon foreign-owned MNEs for 
employment, investment and research & development (R&D)[2]. One outcome, 
shown in Table 2, is that in the large firm category (>250 employees) foreign 
investors represented nearly 50 percent of jobs and 70 percent of turnover in 
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manufacturing, rising to 71 percent and 85 percent if rUK investors are included. (The 
significance of rUK investors is of course a measure of integration within the UK 
single market). Although the figures are less dramatic when all employee size bands 
are included, MNE subsidiaries are still a major presence in manufacturing especially 
by the measure of turnover. Other data (Leonard, 2013) have indicated that the level 
of overseas ownership (i.e. excluding rUK) in the largest enterprises (>250 
employees) increased significantly between 2002 and 2012. 
 
Insert Table 2 near here  
 
 Even more striking are the figures for R&D (Table 3): in manufacturing, overseas-
owned MNEs accounted for 73 percent of R&D spend, with the US as the major 
contributor; considering all sectors the share was only slightly lower at 65 percent. 
Regrettably data are not available on the embeddedness of this R&D within the local 
milieu. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
These inward FDI characteristics are positive and an indicator of Scotland’s 
attractiveness and openness in the global economy. A central issue remains the 
performance of the indigenous private sector: maximizing the benefits from inward 
FDI requires a strong domestic industry possessing the capabilities and capacity to 
absorb technology and to generate positive linkage and spillover benefits. However, 
innovativeness in Scotland is weak on key innovation-related measures, including 
entrepreneurship, the business birth rate, R&D, and innovation activity: 
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Entrepreneurship 
• The proportion of people of working age intending to start a business (in the 
next three years) is well below the UK average; but English migrants and rest 
of world immigrants to Scotland are more entrepreneurial than their non-
migrant peers (Levie, 2013). 
Business birth rate 
• In 2012 Scotland represented 8.8% of the UK population with 6.3% of business 
births and 6.7% of business deaths; and ranked 8th equal among 12 UK regions 
and states in 2012 (ONS, 2011). 
Research and Development 
• Business enterprise R&D in Scotland was 0.59% of Scottish GDP in 2012 
compared with 1.09% for the UK (Scottish Government, 2013b).  Given the 
dominance of R&D in Scotland by inward investors, the weakness of 
indigenous research and development is problematic. 
Innovation activity 
• In 2011 Scotland had 33% innovation-active firms compared with 37% in UK. 
If Scotland is to match UK figure, 500 additional innovation-active firms would 
be required (Turnbull and Richmond, 2013).  
 
Scotland’s Natural Resources and Priority Sectors 
Natural resource FDI 
Unlike the market- and efficiency-seeking focus of FDI attraction in the past, current 
patterns indicate greater diversity, and especially a much stronger performance in 
natural resource-seeking FDI (see Table 4). Diversity is beneficial as the impact of 
volatility and decline in the dominant overseas-owned electronics industry in the 
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1980s and 1990s revealed (Young et al., 1993). Natural resource-seeking FDI has 
shown significant expansion; this has been boosted by the growth of renewables 
where Scotland has strong natural and geographic advantages onshore and offshore 
for wind, wave and tidal power, with substantial expertise from oil and gas and power 
generation industries (CSAs). 
 Over the 2003-2012 period, the four sectoral groupings accounted for 33.9 percent 
of employment and 61.9 percent of capital spending within the FDI total in Scotland. 
Such investment is different, for example, from market- and footloose efficiency- 
seeking FDI in a number of ways: First, natural-resource-seeking investment is 
location-bound and immobile by definition, although there could be a “drifting-away” 
effect in the face of uncertainty; and second, it is not internationally contestable in the 
same way as market/efficiency-seeking FDI and, therefore, may not face the same 
scrutiny regarding investment competitiveness and contribution. Still, the sectors are 
very heterogeneous: for example, some (e.g. oil and gas) are highly capital intensive 
with limited job creation[3]; whereas others like food and tourism are generally 
labour-intensive with a predominance of small firms. 
 
Insert Table 4 near here 
 
Growth sectors 
Recent government trade and investment strategy identified a number of “Growth” 
sectors (Table 1) which have the potential to make a significant contribution to 
development due to: i) distinctive capabilities and the potential for international 
success; ii) providing regional diversity; and iii) overcoming market failures through 
government intervention.  Encompassing the natural-resource based industries, these 
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growth sectors have high levels of Scottish ownership overall, which may be desirable 
from a Scottish government perspective. Thus some have a dominance of very small 
firms (SMEs) and are clearly important for sustaining vulnerable and fragile rural 
economies, tourism being a particular case (Scottish Government, 2009a). Food & 
drink generally fits into this category too with low rates of R&D and levels of skills, 
and a productivity level only 40 percent of foreign-owned MNEs in the sector 
(Scottish Government, 2009b). Consolidation is required in these fragmented and 
small firm sectors. Life sciences has potential associated with the strong science base 
in Scottish universities but it too lacks critical mass (Scottish Government, 2009c[4]). 
 
Export performance 
Trade performance will become an increasingly significant imperative if Scotland 
votes for independence, but also challenging as the country is peripheral to 
international markets raising transaction costs. The possibility of border controls with 
rUK and the more generally negative ‘border effects’ (UK Treasury, 2013) are likely 
to damage (two-way) trade relations. Market-seeking MNE subsidiaries in Scotland 
serving EU and worldwide markets could suffer as the rUK will remain a major 
export destination. A drive for enhanced competitiveness will be critical in these 
circumstances. Estimated rUK data are provided by the Scottish Government and 
these are included in Tables 5 and 6 which follow (see also Dept of BIS, 2013).  
 Although export data are not available by ownership, it is possible to provide 
some interpretation linked to the inward FDI theme, given the size dominance of 
MNE subsidiaries and their sectoral patterns. For example, about 30 percent of 
international exports are derived from around 10 companies; and 50 percent from 
about 50 businesses). Furthermore, large companies (>250 employees) accounted for 
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57 percent of international exports in 2012 and 64 percent of exports to rUK (Scottish 
Government, 2014).  
 
Insert Table 5 near here 
 
 Table 5 shows the top 10 export industries distinguishing exports to international 
and rUK markets. Food & beverages are ranked #1 and #4 respectively for the two 
areas. Whisky (substantially foreign-owned) is by far the largest constituent of food & 
beverage manufacturing at £3.9 billion. Financial and insurance services is ranked #1 
in exports to rUK, where the large Scottish registered companies, RBS, Lloyds and 
Standard Chartered  are major export players[5]. 
 
Insert Table 6 near here 
 
 The importance of rUK as an export destination is highlighted clearly in Table 6: 
rUK exports in 2012 were valued at £45.6 billion in comparison with sales to the #1 
international destination – USA - of £3.6 billion and to all international destinations of 
£26 billion. 
 
Synthesis  
This section of the paper has focused upon the role of inward FDI and MNEs in the 
economy. Coming into the independence referendum, the Scottish economy is 
performing generally well in a UK context, both in terms of overall economic 
performance and FDI attraction. There is more diversity than hitherto and country’s 
strengths in immobile natural resources (CSAs) provide some protection from 
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uncertainty, although the “growth sectors” are a mixed bag. Weaknesses (weak FSAs) 
exist in technologically advanced manufacturing industry; and as has been the case for 
many years the overseas-owned sector needs stronger integration into the economy, 
through improved levels of innovation and absorptive capacity in the domestic private 
sector. There were thus big challenges ahead even before the proposals for Scottish 
independence.  
 
Constitutional Change, International Business and Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment 
In this section, the focus is on the implications of potential independence, 
emphasizing the inward investment and international business dimensions. The 
determinants of inward FDI are well known from the literature, including: a) Market 
size and growth potential; b) Openness; c) Skilled workforce availability; d) 
Clustering / agglomeration potential;  and e) Business climate, including political 
stability and good governance (Driffield et al, 2013; Rugman, 2009; Walsh and Yu, 
2010; Wheeler and Mody, 1992).The evidence on these factors is mixed and strongly 
contextual in terms of country type, sector, firm and investment motivations (Ernst & 
Young, 2012, 2013). But the basic fact is that political instability and institutional 
change and uncertainty are problematic for foreign investors. The high sunk costs of 
capital intensive FDI projects (e.g. oil & gas, renewables), for example, makes 
investors highly sensitive to political risk. 
 The opportunities and challenges facing the economy and businesses and their 
stakeholders are ubiquitous and a summary is presented in Table 7. These are drawn 
inter alia from recent studies published by governments both sides of the border; 
consultants and think-tanks, and academic institutions.  
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Table 7 near here 
 
Challenges of transition 
The most obvious challenges are those derived from the transitional arrangements 
required by a break-up of the UK. These negotiations will inevitably be problematic 
and costly for both Scotland and rUK, with considerable risks and uncertainties for 
international business (as well as for domestic business and the population at large).  
The big contentious issues include: monetary policy (particularly Scottish currency 
and potential currency union with rUK); fiscal policy (debt sharing, public 
expenditure, taxation and welfare payments); EU membership and associated 
questions (including adoption of the Euro, Treaty on Stability, Schengen Agreement 
and border controls, and UK budget rebate);  there are also specific sectoral factors 
particularly in Energy, Defence (and the removal of UK military bases), and Banking 
& Financial services[6]. 
 These transitional costs will take a number of forms (see also Young, 2014):  
1. Institutional: It has been indicated that 200 UK public bodies will need to be re-
created, and that there are 36 national regulators in UK that provide regulatory 
functions in Scotland which will need (Dept. of BIS, 2013); and other evidence 
is cited indicating costs of £15 million to establish or reorganize a single policy 
department. For SDI, operating internationally means building new export 
policy arrangements: the White Paper (Scottish Government, 2013a) proposes 
70-90 diplomatic missions overseas, at a cost of £90-120 million assuming 
sharing takes place with rUK or other countries’ offices. Applications will also 
be required to achieve membership of a range of international organizations 
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including EU, WTO, IMF, OECD and NATO. Although Scotland would be 
assumed to meet most of the membership criteria (EU membership is 
potentially more challenging), it remains the case that the process of accession 
could well be protracted. Interestingly there has been little comment on the 
World Trade Organization which will require commitments in significant areas 
such as rules on national treatment and expropriation[7].  
2. Transactional: These include the costs of transferring or developing new 
administrative systems which relate to the loss of scale economies and the need 
for duplication of activities now spread across the UK; negotiating costs; 
human resource capacity and capability constraints creating inefficiency costs; 
and political costs in respect of managing expectations.  
3. Fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy: These concern restructuring 
taxation and government spending; debt sharing and management; interest rates 
and currency relationships. The debate over a currency union is a critical one 
which would require Scotland ceding some sovereignty on budgetary matters: 
the UK Government and other political parties have to this point rejected the 
Scottish Government’s proposals (see Saunders et al., 2014). The currency 
issue has implications for EU membership which could be blocked if Scotland 
did not have a lender of last report  
4. The Border: Studies of Canada/USA and Czech Republic/Slovakia show 
significant ‘border effects’ in reducing trade (UK Treasury, 2013); and a major 
thrust of Irish Government policy after independence was to reduce the 
country’s dependence on UK trade (Bradley, 2014). While the latter may be 
unlikely in the Scottish case, still Scotland and rUK will face “liabilities of 
foreignness” (Zaheer, 1995) with each other after independence. Scottish 
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businesses will be encouraged to look for new markets. There is recognition of 
the need to take advantage of higher growth emerging markets, in particular 
China, India and Middle East (Scottish Government, 2007), although the 
experience of the UK as a whole has been poor to date. 
5. Risks and uncertainties These relate to: a) political risk or uncertainty about 
future public policies leading to a risk premium; b) default risk because of the 
creditworthiness of both the UK and Scotland; and c) currency risk arising from 
exchange risk uncertainties. Borrowing costs are likely to rise because of 
lenders’ fears about these uncertainties. One example is the Scottish 
Government’s threat to default on its share of UK national debt if a currency 
union is not agreed, which would lead to a default premium (Saunders et al., 
2014). 
 The period of “transition” is of unknown duration, and will vary by sector. Much 
depends on the negotiating stance taken by the UK and Scottish Governments and the 
balance between cooperation and division. Positively, in an analysis of peaceful 
secessions, it was found that: a) secession is irrevocable; b) policies in the two states 
diverge; c) the settlement is made quickly; d) the settlement is accomplished 
constitutionally; and e) the government is broadened and strengthened on both sides, 
and there is a premium on solidarity (Young 1994a,b). Even so the date set for 
independence of March 2016 does appear to be optimistic. 
 
Opportunities 
The potential opportunities from independence are much softer than their cost and 
uncertainty counterparts; and, moreover, incorporate imperatives facing the economy 
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for a lengthy period from the past, and in some cases could have been progressed 
using existing devolved powers (See also Oxford Economics, 2014:80).  
 Yet there are opportunities such as the potential for better tailoring of policy 
measures to match the country’s potential. Edinburgh will grow as the capital city of 
an independent country; and research by the Centre for Cities (2014) revealed that in 
the 2010-2012 years, Edinburgh was ranked #2 in the UK for private sector job 
creation after London. Aside from greater investment by business services firms, 
counterintuitively there may be some potential for attracting regional headquarters of 
MNEs (especially if corporate taxes are lowered). “Brand Scotland” should further be 
enhanced by independence, and includes the requirement for brand development in 
FDI attraction: in evidence to a UK Select Committee, SDI (2012) admitted that 
“potential investors are unaware of the benefits of locating in Scotland in terms 
of…skills, research base, infrastructure etc”. The Scottish Government is placing 
great store on renewable technologies as a mechanism for reindustrialization, and 
Table 8 provides a brief case of this sector and initiatives being pursued. 
 
Insert Table 8 near here 
 
Managing Political Risk 
Political risk is usually associated with host  government interference with business 
operations (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Kobrin, 1979). Managing political risk 
requires i) protecting new and existing operations and investments domestically and 
internationally; and ii) exploiting the opportunities arising from constitutional change 
- in the interests of stakeholders (shareholders, customers, employees) (PwC, 2006) - 
during the hiatus of uncertainty of indeterminate duration if Scotland votes for 
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independence. Each company needs to consider its own situation and make 
contingency plans, first, for the short-term to protect the business for stakeholders and 
manage change; and, second, for the medium/long-term to take strategic decisions on 
international business operations. 
 Interpreting the patterns and evidence on inward FDI in Scotland, conceptually the 
impact of independence in terms of Degree of political risks and uncertainties may be 
presented as a 2x2 matrix where the horizontal axis is represented by the Market 
scope of the foreign MNE subsidiary (Scotland/rUK or Regional/Global) and the 
vertical axis by Operations mode (Exports or Value chain integration). There are thus 
four categories of inward investors:  
• Cell 1 is characteristic of subsidiaries which primarily operate domestically and 
export to rUK. Uncertainty is high because of the “border effect”: aside from 
the likelihood of border controls, there are also emergent liabilities of 
foreignness. Hotels and tourism are good illustration given the high numbers of 
short-break visitors from rUK to Scotland. Renewable energy is in a similar 
position where substantial exports take place to rUK; and financial services too.  
• Subsidiaries in Cell 2 are rUK focused but their business model is more 
complex than those in Cell 1, involving two-way flows of products and services 
/ raw materials and semi-finished goods. There may be many companies 
operating as sellers and buyers or managing more complex value chains in the 
former single market. Data show that in terms of integration into supply chains, 
Scotland is much more integrated with rUK than the rest of the world. Across 
all industries, 60 percent of inputs are sourced in Scotland, 30 percent from 
rUK, and 10 percent from the rest of the world (Dept of BIS, 2013; UK 
Treasury, 2013). 
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• Cell 3 firms comprise regionally/globally focused exporters. Food and drink 
exporters (whisky by far the largest, but salmon farming too) provide good 
illustrations. And generally, assuming a supportive business environment, there 
would be opportunities for firms for which “UK markets are less important than 
international sales” such as “machinery & equipment and computers and 
electronics” (Oxford Economics, 2014; see also MacKay, 2014). 
• Cell 4 firms comprise MNE subsidiaries operating within integrated 
regional/global (but primarily the former) value chains. In the past the 
electronics companies were in this category and were highly vulnerable to 
changing international cost competitiveness. At present there are fewer 
subsidiaries in this situation, but reorganization of Scotland/rUK activities 
within such value chains will be necessary. 
 
Insert Figure 3 near here 
 
 To complete the model, specifically sectoral factors need to be included, 
especially in the high political risk industries of energy (particularly oil & gas but also 
renewables and utilities); banking & financial services; and defence. The energy 
sector is highly complex: oil & gas is immobile with high sunk costs and subject to 
continuing government intervention, beginning with negotiating Scotland’s oil share. 
Oil and gas revenues are volatile and declining but still of considerable importance. 
High capital intensity means that returns accrue primarily to shareholders, the bulk of 
whom are not Scottish residents, and hence uncertainty may lead to higher outflows of 
profits. In addition, there are problematic questions over tax relief guarantees on the 
decommissioning of oil & gas infrastructure to encourage continuing investment 
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activity (estimated at £30 billion) which could influence FDI decisions. There are also 
substantial flows of subsidized renewable energy-generated electricity flowing into 
the English market which will be a negotiating issue between the rUK and Scottish 
governments if independence occurs (The Economist, 2014).   
 Banking, insurance & financial services is a huge sector relative to the size of the 
economy. The Scottish registered behemoths RBS, Lloyds and Standard Life will 
become Scottish-owned MNEs; and are taking steps to protect their interests by 
registering new companies in rUK which could include headquarters functions. 
Similar behaviour is to be expected among overseas-owned subsidiaries. In defence, 
shipbuilding is currently dependent upon orders from the Ministry of Defence. Job 
cuts were announced across the UK in early 2014 and an independence vote could 
lead to the curtailment of Royal Navy contracts; and linked to this is the commitment 
to close the nuclear submarine base in Scotland (a long-term project).  
 For the parent MNEs (substantially US-based) of Scottish subsidiaries, concerns 
over an independence vote will be especially high where the latter represent one or 
more of the following: i) a high proportion of the group assets, operations or 
international revenues; ii) a central role within regional/global supply chains and the 
“global factory”; iii) an important location for innovation hubs and decision centres 
for the MNE group; and iv) expansion plans in Scotland are at an advanced stage as 
the independence referendum approaches (see also PwC, 2006). 
 
Domestic firm behaviour and implications for inward FDI 
While the focus of this paper has been inward FDI, the behaviour of domestic firms in 
Scotland may also have wider implications for the absorptive capacity of the 
indigenous players to capture the spillover effects of FDI. This is particularly salient if 
19 
 
they seek to reduce their exposure to political uncertainty during the transition 
towards independence (or even in the event of a vote to remain part of the union)..  
Here, the experience of Quebec in Canada is instructive.  
 Between 1978 and 1981, 30 corporate headquarters moved from Montreal, in the 
province of Quebec, to Toronto in the neighbouring province of Ontario. According to 
the Fraser Institute, a Canadian think-tank, the top 500 companies located in 
Montreal, Quebec’s largest city, dropped from 96 in 1990 to 75 by 2011. While the 
reasons for the decline of Montreal are complex and multi-causal, they also parallel 
the rise of nationalism and two referendums on independence in 1980 and 1995. The 
loss of corporate headquarters in Quebec also meant a decline in supporting business 
services, the concentration of which can result in both spillover and spinoff effects for 
other companies located, or locating in the region (Gainer, 2011). 
 While there are important differences (e.g. cultural and linguistic) between the 
Quebec experience and Scotland, the risk of large domestic firms relocating head 
office functions to the rUK, Europe or further abroad, may well have knock-on effects 
for both Scotland’s attractiveness in the short to medium term for FDI, and also for 
the capabilities and capacity of domestic firms to capture the positive benefits of FDI 
spill-over effects. A qualitative sampling based on interviews of senior business 
leaders in Scotland, for instance, suggests that upwards of 10 percent of the 60 
interviewed are putting in place contingency plans to migrate head office operations 
out of Scotland (MacKay, 2014; see also Botham and Clelland, 2005).  
 Research by international business scholars has emphasized two dimensions of the 
local context that influences FDI attractiveness. The first is how differences in 
institutional frameworks (formal and informal) influence business strategies of both 
foreign entrants (Meyer et al., 2011) and local firms (Peng, 2003). With formal 
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institutions becoming increasingly mobile, and informal institutions relatively 
immobile, MNEs must weigh up the benefits and costs of adapting to local contexts 
when deciding on the international attractiveness of location (Meyer et al., 2011).    
 The second dimension is the relative resource endowments of people, local firms 
and the wider economy (Dunning, 1998). Resources can be ‘natural’ or ‘competency’ 
based, but form the basis of a country’s location advantages (Meyer et al., 2011). The 
relocation of head office functions by Scottish domestic firms to the rUK or beyond 
would, therefore, decrease the location advantages of competency-seeking FDI, with 
the prospect of also diminishing the absorptive capacity of domestic firms to take 
advantage of spillover benefits from foreign firms locating subsidiaries in Scotland. 
On the other hand, the countervailing ‘capital city’ effect noted above could enhance 
Scotland’s capacity, including for regional HQ attraction. 
 
Conclusions 
The continued importance of overseas-owned MNEs for the Scottish economy is clear 
from this paper but the subsidiaries are generally weakly embedded, meaning in effect 
a dual economy. So in the trying conditions which seem likely to pertain in the early 
years of an independent Scotland, a much greater emphasis upon building an 
innovative domestic private sector is critical. The country’s comparative advantage in 
location-bound natural resource industries provides a degree of protection from 
closure or relocation which was absent among the footloose market-seeking MNEs of 
the past. Still, some at least of the natural resource “growth” sectors lack an 
innovation-orientation. Furthermore, while this paper has shown that much attention 
is now being paid to “reindustrializing through renewables”, independence-related 
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uncertainties loom large.  It is also worth noting, however, that the Scottish 
government has a record of commitment to and leadership in this sector. 
 The MNE subsidiaries in Scotland have mostly been quiet over the forthcoming 
referendum. This is unlike the position of some of the Scottish-based MNEs, as the 
Oxford Economics (2014) report for the Scottish headquartered global engineering 
giant the Weir Group shows, and of course the Scottish headquartered banks and 
financial services companies; although not all are negative in their attitudes to  
independence. The caution of the foreign-owned sector likely reflects a view that 
independence is a decision for Scots and concerns about alienating the Scottish 
Government. Since secession is a relatively uncommon event, even the parents of 
these MNE subsidiaries are inexperienced in managing independence and its 
aftermath.  
 The business environment will be uncertain and risky in the early years after any 
independence vote in September 2014. This works through to political risk for MNE 
subsidiaries at both the operational level (decisions concerning business processes and 
operating systems associated with a plethora of re-created institutions) and the 
strategic level (dealing with market scope and operation modes and other major 
decisions). The independence-related issues may become embroiled with the wider 
politics of both the rUK and indeed potentially the EU. Given Scotland’s relative 
stability, however, and the government’s public commitment to policies that foster 
economic growth, it is possible that opportunities, as well as the more well-defined 
risks, exist for MNE investment. 
 Researchers in different fields, including international business and management 
and international political economy, have a major role to play in identifying these 
opportunities and risks. The study of international political economy has been on a 
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back-burner for some years (but see Eden and Lenway, 2001; Grosse, 2005) and may 
now begin to see a stronger revival. The material in this paper itself may be analyzed 
from a more formal international business perspective, applying, for example, the 
CSA-FSA (country-specific and firm-specific advantages) framework of Rugman and 
Verbeke (2009) -  if Scotland votes for independence. 
 
Notes 
1. As with the fDi Intelligence data, that of Ernst & Young is based on public 
announcements, intelligence and business surveys, and may not identify all 
projects. For both sources, employment data are based on estimates.  
2. The statistics which follow mostly draw from Scottish Government sources. 
There are two sources: The Global Connections Survey, an annual survey of 
businesses collecting information on exports and international connections in 
Scotland (Scottish Government, 2014); and the Business, Enterprise and 
Energy Statistics (Scottish Government, 2013b). The two datasets are not 
directly comparable.  
3. The oil industry has also been one of the favourite sectors in arguing the 
“obsolescing bargain view” (Eden et al, 2005; Grosse, 2005).  
4. For sectoral reviews, see the Key Sector Reports listed in the References, plus 
Hood et al. (2002). 
5. This accounts for the announcements in the financial companies’ Annual 
Reports 2013 that they would be setting up new companies in England to lower 
their risk profile. 
23 
 
6. Due to space constraints, readers should consult some of the references cited 
earlier and in the Addendum to the References. An excellent primer is 
McCrone (2013); see also Goudie (2013). 
7. Presentation by Alan M. Rugman on Scottish Independence, Quebec and MNEs 
at the AIB UK&I Conference at the University of York, 11th April 2014. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Scotland’s International Trade and Investment Strategy 2011-2105 
 
Opportunity 1: Internationalization 
a. More businesses trading internationally 
b. Greater support for growth companies 
c. International exploitation of Scotland’s education sector 
 
Opportunity 2: Inward Investment 
a. Greater focus on strategic inward investment 
b. Embedding companies, encouraging expansion and supplier links 
c. Low carbon opportunities 
 
Growth Sectors: Food & drink, Financial & business services, Life sciences, Energy 
(including Renewables), Sustainable tourism and Creative industries. Plus enabling 
technologies, and opportunities in Healthcare and Education. 
Priority Emerging markets: China, India, Middle East  
Priority: Wider promotion of Scotland 
 
Source: Scottish Development International (2011); The Scottish Government (2007) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage of registered enterprises employment and turnover in Scotland, 
by country of ownership (Employee size band 250+) (March 2013) 
Employment Scotland 
(%) 
rUK 
(%) 
Abroad* 
(%) 
Manufacturing  28.7 22.6 48.7 
All sectors 36.5 34.9 28.6 
Turnover Scotland 
(%) 
rUK 
(%) 
Abroad* 
(%) 
Manufacturing  15.3 15.8 68.9 
All sectors 21.9 27.6 50.5 
 
*Not further analyzed in source. 
Source: Scottish Government, Businesses in Scotland 2013 
  
Table 3. Percentage of expenditure and employment on R&D in Scotland, by country 
of ownership (2012) 
R&D 
Expenditure  
 
Scotland 
(%) 
rUK 
(%) 
Other 
EU 
(%) 
USA Rest of 
world 
(%) 
Manufacturing 24.7 2.0 19.6 47.2 6.4 
All sectors 32.0 2.7 19.9 38.0 7.3 
R&D 
Employment  
 
Scotland 
(%) 
rUK 
(%) 
Other 
EU 
USA Rest of 
world 
(%) 
Manufacturing n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. 
All sectors 44.2 2.4 13.4 32.4 7.5 
 
Source:  The Scottish Government, Business Enterprise Research and Development 
Data for Scotland (2013b); Office for National Statistics 
  
Table 4. Natural Resource-Based FDI Projects in Scotland (2003-Oct. 2012) 
Sector No. of 
projec
-ts 
Jobs 
created  
% of 
total 
jobs  - 
all 
sectors 
Av. jobs 
created 
per 
project 
Capital 
invest. 
US$m 
% of all 
capital 
invest. - 
all sectors 
Av. 
capital 
invest. per 
project 
US$m 
Coal, oil 
& 
natural 
gas 
47 7,453 9.7 158 7,399 30.0 157 
Food, 
drink & 
tobacco 
45 11,658 15.2 259 999 4.1 22 
Renewa-
ble 
energy 
39 2,555 3.4 65 5,012 20.4 129 
Hotels & 
tourism 
28 4,258 5.6 152 1,828 7.4 65 
Totals  159 25,924 33.9% 163 15,238 61.9 95.8 
 
Note: All of these industries are included within the Scottish Government Growth 
Sectors. Excluded are Life Sciences, Creative industries and Financial & Business 
Services which are not Natural resource-based. 
Source: Calculated from Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013, Table 
A1) citing fDI Intelligence from Financial Times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Scotland’s top 10 international export Industries, by value, 2012 (and rUK 
comparisons) 
 
Industry Sector Exports to 
International
Markets £m 
 
Rank:Top 10 
Exports to 
International 
Markets 
Exports to 
rUK £m 
Rank: Top 
10 Exports 
to rUK 
Manufacture of food, 
beverages and tobacco 
products 
4665  
 
1 4080  4 
Of which Distilling, 
rectifying and blending 
of spirits 
3930 nr 685  nr 
Manufacture of coke, 
refined petroleum and 
chemical products 
4135 2 2600  6 
Business services*, 
engineering, technical 
testing and analysis  
1720 3 2930  5 
Wholesale, retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
1650 4 4660  3 
Financial and insurance 
activities 
1415 5 9815  1 
Manufacture of 
machinery and 
equipment NEC 
1275 6 495  nr 
Mining and quarrying 1145 7 2535  7 
Manufacture of 
computer, electronic and 
optical products 
1080 8 750  nr 
Manufacture of 
transport equipment 
990 9 1430  10 
Admin. and support 
services 
990 10 2095  8 
Utilities 365 nr 4920  2 
Transportation and 
storage 
710 nr 2045  9 
*Business services are: Legal, accounting, management, architecture activities 
Note: Only top 10 are ranked. nr = Not ranked. 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Global Connections Survey (2014) 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6. Scotland’s top 10 destinations for international exports 
 (and exports to rUK) (2012) 
 
Rank Destination Total 
Exports 
(£m) 
1 USA 3555 
2 Netherlands 2665 
3 France 2165 
4 Germany 1525 
5 Norway 920 
6 Switzerland 870 
7 Spain 830 
8 Eire 815 
9 Belgium 735 
10 Denmark 645 
Total 10 
countries 19295 
Total All 
International 
Exports 
All 
destinations 25995 
rUK Exports rUK 45570 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Global Connections Survey (2014) 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7. Opportunities and Challenges for the Future of FDI and International 
Business in an Independent Scotland 
 
Challenges and Costs of Transition 
• Institutional: re-creation of UK public bodies; legal and regulatory; formal and 
informal institutional factors. Membership of international organizations, 
including EU (membership and terms), WTO, IMF.  
• Transactional: negotiating costs; administrative systems; human resource 
constraints; political costs. 
• Fiscal, monetary & exchange rate policy: currency; restructuring taxation and 
public spending; debt management. 
• The Border: trade barriers; immigration controls; liabilities of foreignness. 
• Risks and uncertainties for businesses and all stakeholders: political risk; 
default risk; currency risk. 
Note: 
1. Costs may be: i) short-term & long-term; ii) fixed & variable; iii) national, 
regional and global; iv) economic & political. 
2. Many of the transitional challenges have sectoral dimensions e.g. energy; 
defence; banking & financial services. 
 
Opportunities 
• New policy opportunities, where more tailored policy measures can be 
promoted e.g. airport policy; competition policy; patents; R&D support. 
• Reindustrialization through strategic coupling in renewable technologies. 
• Creative use of fiscal policy levers e.g. corporation tax (although benefits 
contested e.g. ‘race to the bottom’). 
• Increased drive for connectedness within the global knowledge economy. 
• Requirement to exploit new market opportunities, as businesses in Scotland 
redirect operations away from the rUK (and vice versa). 
• A further enhanced role for Edinburgh as the capital of an independent 
Scotland. 
• An expanded role for Scottish universities, in building an advanced 
manufacturing sector through collaborative R&D with inward investors. But 
also various negatives e.g. loss of research council funding; need to 
concentrate of narrower range of research areas. 
• Requirement and opportunities for improved branding of Scotland as a 
business location for FDI; plus in sectors like food and tourism. 
• Enhanced entrepreneurialism - psychological urge to action following 
independence despite risk and uncertainty (‘animal spirits’, Keynes 1936). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Reindustrialization through renewable technologies 
 
The Scottish government’s commitment to the development of renewable energy has 
attracted substantial inward investment from companies such as Doosan, Mitsubishi 
and Gamesa. The explicit government strategy has been to encourage diversification 
and use of the skills and technologies developed in the oil and gas of industries in this 
new renewables sector.  McDonald and Jennings (2013) have discussed the value of 
the government’s general commitment to innovation hubs and partnering of university 
R&D activity with MNEs.  In the renewable energy sector, support for initiatives such 
as the European Offshore Wind Deployment Centre in Aberdeen (a joint venture with 
Vattenfall of Sweden), the European Marine Energy Centre, with its many overseas-
based partners, based in Orkney and the announcement of the Saltire Prize, a £10m 
incentive for the development of wave or tidal energy has established Scotland in the 
vanguard of these technologies.  Cowell et.al. (2013) noted how the political 
commitment and leadership in this sector had encouraged the development of a close 
policy community that was able to work effectively with businesses and provide the 
infrastructure, labour-market and planning support that sustains long-run investment 
and growth.  Although not without its risks, the relationship between the Scottish 
government and the renewable energy sector is an example of the type of deliberate 
and strategic coupling that attracts inward investment and facilitates ongoing research, 
development and innovation of new technologies that are central to global production 
networks. (Coe et al., 2004; MacKinnon, 2012).  It is encapsulated in the First 
Minister’s commitment to renewables as “the source of Scotland’s reindustrialization” 
(Salmond, 2012). 
 
Appendix 1.  Scottish parliament powers pre-independence referendum 
 
Key dates: 18 September 2014 Referendum on Independence; 7 May 2015; UK 
Government Elections; 24 March 2016 planned Independence Day; 5 May 2016 
Scottish Government Elections ((The Scottish Government, White Paper 2013a). The 
Conservative Government has also proposed 2017 as the year for an in/out 
referendum on UK membership of the EU.  
Devolved powers to Scottish Parliament 
(established 1999) 
Reserved powers to UK Parliament 
• Agriculture, forestry & fisheries 
• Education & training 
• Environment 
• Health & social services 
• Housing 
• Law & order 
• Sport & the arts 
• Tourism & economic 
development 
• Transport (largely) 
 
Additional powers from Scotland Act 
2012. Some (e.g. income tax) will not 
come into effect for several years: 
• Benefits & social security 
• Immigration 
• Defence 
• Employment 
• Broadcasting 
• Trade & energy 
• Energy: nuclear; coal, gas, 
electricity 
• Consumer rights & data 
protection 
• The Constitution 
• New Scottish rate of income tax 
• New borrowing powers 
• Control of stamp duty, land tax & 
landfill tax 
• Powers over misuse of drugs; 
drink-driving limit; national speed 
limit; administration of elections.  
Note: devolved powers in Economic and Industrial Development matters 
As is evident from above, Scotland has had high level of independence for many 
years in areas of economic development: human capital formation (education, skills, 
health); transport and industrial development, including financial assistance to 
industry (e.g. Regional Selective Assistance). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Inward FDI trends in Scotland by sector (2003-Oct. 2012) 
Sector No. of 
projec-
ts 
Jobs 
created  
% of 
total 
jobs  - 
all 
sectors 
Av. 
jobs 
created 
per 
project 
Capital 
invest. 
US$m 
% of all 
capital 
invest. - 
all sectors 
Av. 
capital 
invest. per 
project 
US$m 
Software 
& IT 
services 
69 3,658 4.8 53 635 2.6 9 
Indust. 
Machin-
ery, 
Equip. & 
Tools 
68 2,957 3.9 43 281 1.1 4 
Business 
services 
61 4,663 6.1 76 287 1.2 5 
Finan-
cial 
services 
50 4,857 6.3 97 1,175 4.8 24 
Coal, oil 
& 
natural 
gas 
47 7,453 9.7 158 7,399 30.0 157 
Food, 
drink & 
tobacco 
45 11,658 15,2 259 999 4.0 22 
Renewa-
ble 
energy 
39 2,555 3.3 65 5,012 20.4 129 
Textiles 30 2,082 2.7 69 560 2.3 19 
Hotels & 
tourism 
28 4,258 5.6 152 1,828 7.4 65 
Pharma-
ceuticals 
28 1,649 2.2 58 289 1.2 10 
Other 
sectors 
280 30,778 40.2 109 6,161 25.0 22 
Totals 745 76,568 100.0% 102 24, 626 100.0% 33 
Notes: 
1. Project and capital investment data derived from public announcements, 
intelligence and business surveys; employment data based on estimates. No stock data 
were available. 
2. Based on 81 projects into Scotland, key investment determinants were  i) skilled 
workforce availability (37%); ii)  domestic market growth potential (24.7%); iii) 
proximity to markets or customers. Access to resources is an underlying determinant 
in the resource-based sectors (Coal, oil and natural gas; Food, drink & tobacco; 
Renewable energy; and Hotels & tourism). 
Source: Calculated from Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013, Table 
A1) citing fDI Intelligence from Financial Times 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Degree of risk and uncertainty for foreign-owned MNE subsidiaries in 
Scotland - by market scope and operations mode 
 
 
 
 
 
OPERATIONS 
MODE    
                                         MARKET SCOPE 
 Degree of  
risk and 
uncertainty 
 
Scotland/rUK  Regional/Global 
Exports 
 
1. Moderate/High 3. Low 
Value 
Chain 
integration 
2. High 4. Low/Moderate 
          Source: Authors 
 
